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Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory:
Re-assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish
Foreign and Domestic Politics
EDWARD WASTNIDGE
Open University, UK
ABSTRACT Since the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Turkish
government’s foreign and increasingly domestic politics have been characterized as ‘neo-
Ottoman,’ a concept which both its critics and champions have wielded in different ways. The
article revisits and reassesses articulations of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy, and
explores the significance of its appearance in Turkey’s domestic politics in Turkey. In doing so,
it offers an explanation that draws out the distinct and varied interpretations of neo-Ottomanism
present in such debates. It argues that neo-Ottomanism as used within a foreign policy milieu is
not without its analytical use but is contestable due to its wide range of interpretations.
Following this, the article analyzes the more recent appearance of the concept of neo-
Ottomanism in Turkish domestic politics, highlighting its confluence with the increasing
authoritarianism of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a newly empowered president. It highlights how
the AKP has embraced and appropriated a precisely delineated neo-Ottomanism as a rhetorical
and legitimating framework for its domestic policies. In doing so, the article demonstrates how
neo-Ottomanism as developed and understood in the foreign policy arena initially, has been
adopted in domestic politics under the AKP.
KEY WORDS: Neo-Ottomanism; Turkish domestic politics; Turkish foreign policy; Turkey
For at least the past decade, neo-Ottomanism has served as one of the main conceptual
tools for understanding Turkish foreign policy. More recently, the concept also has
emerged in Turkish domestic political discourses, albeit in a distinct manner from, yet
relevant to, its foreign policy equivalent. Nevertheless, despite its long-standing pres-
ence in discourses and analyses of Turkish foreign policy, and its more recent, but
increasingly frequent appearances in Turkish domestic politics, neo-Ottomanism has
remained a contested concept. When referencing Turkish foreign policy, its usage is
applied in myriad different ways, but in domestic politics, it thus far has remained
under-examined.
The main aim of this article is to explore how neo-Ottomanism, as initially devel-
oped and applied in the foreign policy arena, has been adopted in domestic politics. In
doing so, my objective is to make a threefold contribution to existing interpretations
of, and literature on, neo-Ottomanism. First, I offer an overview of how neo-
Ottomanism has been used in analyses of Turkish foreign policy. The concept’s omni-
presence in foreign policy discourses and analyses has resulted in a range of applica-
tions; indeed, it might be its very nebulousness that has contributed to its discursive
and analytical popularity. The explanations in the article offer one way of understand-
ing the different interpretations and applications of neo-Ottomanism in discourses and
analyses of Turkish foreign policy. My second contribution is a critical assessment of
neo-Ottomanism for understanding contemporary Turkish foreign policy. The concep-
tual contestability of neo-Ottomanism also is supplemented by scholars’ varied inter-
pretations of how this constitutes soft power projection by Turkey.
In the third section of this article, I examine the appearance of neo-Ottomanism in
Turkish domestic politics under the AKP. I explore the significance of its appearance,
and how it has been adopted in the domestic sphere. While in foreign policy the
Turkish government has been wary of the neo-Ottoman label, while at the same time
still embracing its Ottoman heritage, it has been more consistent, and indeed has
embraced and appropriated a more precisely delineated neo-Ottomanism as a rhetorical
and legitimating framework for its domestic policies. Thus, neo-Ottomanism has
acquired a distinct meaning in domestic politics, and has materialized in a host of
recent government policies. This is ever more prescient following the AKP’s response
to the failed coup attempt of 2016, and the constitutional amendments enacted by
President Erdogan in 2017.
Before moving on to the main arguments of the paper, a brief epistemological and
methodological note might be in order. First, the bifurcated analysis offered in this art-
icle is not meant to indicate that foreign and domestic politics are sealed off from one
another, nor that the distinction between international and domestic politics is clear
and unproblematic. The bifurcation serves only heuristic purposes, providing a clear
framework for exploring the discursive iterations of neo-Ottomanism. Second, in refer-
ence to Turkey’s foreign policy, the concept of neo-Ottomanism has been articulated
by both the Turkish government (in self-representations of its role and position in the
international sphere), and in analyses of Turkish foreign policy by other international
actors, as well as within academic literature. Articulations of neo-Ottomanism as prac-
ticed by the AKP in domestic politics thus far have remained under-analyzed, although
authors have discussed antecedents under the party’s Refah party predecessor within
the context of its use as a counter to Kemalism.1 It is for this reason that it is possible
to explore the foreign policy articulations of neo-Ottomanism through critical engage-
ment with the foreign policy literature on neo-Ottomanism. As there is as yet little aca-
demic engagement with more recent domestic articulations of neo-Ottomanism, my
research relies largely on analyses of statements and images in circulation in popu-
lar media.
1 See further: Esra €Ozy€urek (2004) Miniaturizing Atat€urk: Privatization of State Imagery and Ideology in
Turkey, American Ethnologist, 31(3) pp. 374–391; E. €Ozy€urek (2006) Nostalgia for the Modern: State
Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press); Alev C¸ınar (2006)
Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press); and Yael Navarro-Yashin (2002) Faces of the State: Secularism And Public Life In
Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
What is Neo-Ottomanism?
For at least the last decade, the concept of neo-Ottomanism has been omnipresent in
both academic and wider analyses of Turkish foreign policy.2 Although some analyses
of neo-Ottomanism have pointed out that references to neo-Ottoman foreign policy
ambitions have preceded the coming to power of the AK Party (AKP) government in
2003,3 ‘neo-Ottoman foreign policy’ now most commonly has been associated with
the AKP government of Prime Minister (later, President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Minister of Foreign Affairs (later, Prime Minister) Ahmet Davutoglu. Generally framed
as either pragmatic or neo-Ottoman in character, the AKP’s foreign policy has
attracted considerable attention.4
My analyses of the foreign policy literature, as well as broader, non-academic media
and policy discourses referencing ‘neo-Ottoman foreign policy,’ reveal the presence of
a variety of distinct yet not necessarily mutually exclusive interpretations of neo-
Ottomanism, many of which retain a degree of vagueness and ambiguity that calls for
a detailed analysis of these distinct interpretations and the manner in which they are
mobilized. As Nicholas Danforth aptly points out,5 what neo-Ottomanism stands for
depends on how one imagines the Ottoman Empire, with a variety of ‘Ottoman
Empires’ coexisting in the Turkish and, one should add, international imagination.
Broadly speaking, three distinct images of the Ottoman Empire underpin analyses
and self-representations of Turkish foreign and domestic policy under the AKP govern-
ment: (1) the image of the Ottoman Empire as the cradle or apex of civilization; (2)
the image of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic Empire; and (3) the image of the
Ottoman Empire as a liberal, multicultural empire. In line with the image of the
Ottoman Empire as the ‘cradle’ or ‘apex’ of civilization, Turkey, as heir to the
Empire, is positioned as the guardian and proprietor of its cultural legacy, a legacy it
is responsible for cultivating within the region, and sharing with the world.
Representative of this discourse are then Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements on
Turkish culture:
For thousands of years, we have been the carriers of a unique civilization, history
and heritage in which we have molded and collated different cultures, different
civilizations, along with our own culture;
2 See further: €Omer Tas¸pinar (2008) Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and
Kemalism, Carnegie Papers, 10, pp. 1–28; Ayhan Kaya (2013) Yunus Emre Cultural Centers: The
AKP’s Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Perspectives, 5, pp. 56–60; Nicholas Danforth (2014) Multi-
Purpose Empire: Ottoman History in Republican Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 50(4), pp. 655–678;
Cınar Kiper (2013) Sultan Erdogan: Turkey’s Rebranding Into the New, Old Ottoman Empire, The
Atlantic, April 5, 2013. Available at: http://theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-edrogan-
turkeys-rebranding-into-the-new-old-ottoman-empire/274724/; Bilgehan €Ozt€urk (2013) Turkey’s New
Foreign Policy: A Manifestation of Neo-Ottomanism?, EuroAsia News: Analysis, September 27, 2013.
Available at: http://www.euroasianews.com/analysis-turkeys-new-foreign-policy-a-manifestation-of-neo-
ottomanism/; and Kubilay Arin (2014) The New Turkey: A Rival to the West in the Near East, E-
International Relations, June 5, 2014. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/05/the-new-turkey-a-
rival-to-the-west-in-the-near-east/, accessed January 16, 2018.
3 See further €Ozt€urk, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy.
4 See, for example, N. Danforth (2008) Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From
Atat€urk to the AKP, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 7(3), pp. 83–95.
5 N. Danforth (2014) The Empire Strikes Back, Foreign Policy, March 27, 2014. Available at: http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/27/the-empire-strikes-back-2/, accessed January 20, 2018.
and on language:
Turkish is not only the communicative language of the people living in these
lands. Turkish is also a language of science and at the same time a language of
arts and a language of literature.6
Then Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made similar statements on the
occasion of the inauguration of the Yunus Emre Foundation in 2007. The foundation
is responsible for the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers that have opened in Europe, the
Middle East, Asia and North America and is itself a good example of the materializa-
tion of this discursive strand of neo-Ottomanism. According to Davutoglu,
the foundation:
… has two important standing goals. First [is] to enable the meeting of our
national culture and universal culture, and [second] to increase its influence in
universal culture. [As] very few nations that have directly encountered different
cultures and civilizations have become the subject of those civilizations, [but
rather] sometimes generated cultural blends from these civilizations, sometimes
participated in intense and active communication as our nation has. [It is
incumbent on Turkey to] lead the way to a new Enlightenment in the Balkans.7
On the inauguration of a Yunus Emre Center in Astana, Kazakhstan, former presi-
dent Abdullah Gul (and honorary president of the Yunus Emre Foundation) talked of
Turkey’s imperative to disseminate its language and culture beyond its borders:
We should not keep our language, culture and traditions to ourselves. Rather, we
should keep them alive and spread them.8
More or less generous interpretations of this ‘cultural’ neo-Ottomanism have been
made. On more generous readings, ‘cultural’ neo-Ottomanism has been figured as a
relatively benign or indeed desirable development, with Turkey taking its rightful place
as the fulcrum of regional cultural, as well as social and political cooperation. For
instance, €Omer Tas¸pinar argues that while Turkish foreign policy is at least in some
respects neo-Ottoman it is devoid of imperialist expansionism of the kind practiced by
the Ottoman Empire itself; it is simply a tool for asserting Turkey’s rightful place as a
cultural, political and economic hegemon in the region.9 For Tas¸pinar, neo-
Ottomanism is like French Gaullism, in that it seeks Turkish ‘grandeur’ and influence
in foreign policy.10 Thus, depending on how one views Gaullism, the likening of neo-
Ottomanism to Gaullism is either a more or less positive appraisal of the neo-
Ottomanism of Turkish foreign policy. A less generous reading might figure this as
cultural imperialism, leading to concern that cultural imperialism might, or is indeed
intended to, turn into political and economic hegemony. Indeed, as Lerna Yanık
6 Quoted in Kaya, Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, p. 57.
7 Ibid, p. 58.
8 Ibid.
9 Tas¸pinar, Turkey’s Middle East Policies, p. 1.
10 Ibid, p. 3.
argues, the Empire’s supposed and imagined multicultural experience, and its ethnic
and linguistic relations with certain states ‘…were viewed as giving Turkey permis-
sion to be involved in their future.’11 For those concerned with Turkey’s increasing
hegemony in the region, assertions such as those by Davutoglu that Turkey ‘…will
reintegrate the Balkan region, Middle East and Caucasus… together with Turkey as
the center of world politics in the future’12 are troublesome. One can observe this in
the response of regional states, such as Iran, who are loath to see any such restor-
ation—evidence of which can be seen in the Iranian press with Erdogan described as
the ‘Ottoman Don Quixote’ in the newspaper Shahrvand following his visit to Tehran
in April, 2015.13
The second image of the Ottoman Empire that underpins discourses and analyses of
Turkish foreign policy is the image of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic Empire. One
can point to weaker and stronger versions of the association between neo-Ottomanism
and Islamism. In the weak version, Neo-Ottomanism as Islamism is seen as an antidote
to excesses of Kemalism, with its militant secularism, nationalism, and
Westernization.14 Neo-Ottomanism thus is seen as a corrective to these excesses,
emphasizing and positively valuing Turkey’s position between East and West. Thus,
Turkey’s foreign policy re-orientation away from Europe and toward the Middle East
and North Africa is portrayed not as a ‘turning away’ from the ‘West,’ but as an
appropriate re-balancing of its historical responsibilities and contemporary regional
interests. Representative of this discourse is the following statement from Erdogan:
Turkey is facing the West, but Turkey never turns her back on the East. We
cannot be indifferent to countries with whom we have lived for thousands of
years. We cannot abandon our brothers to their fate.15
Rasim €Ozg€ur D€onmez considers neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy as being con-
nected to a paternalistic sense of nationhood that seeks to promote Islamic solidarity
and thus create an alternative paradigm to the Western-centric world order. Islam and
the Islamic world are therefore a key reference point driving a civilizational conception
of Turkey’s central place in world politics.16 Hakan Yavuz notes that ‘…many pun-
dits and critics of Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics use this specific term as an
epithet to indicate the gradual Islamization of domestic politics and Islamic irredentism
in foreign policy.’17 Stronger associations between neo-Ottomanism and Islamism are
generally (though not exclusively) made by critics of AKP’s foreign and domestic pol-
icies, who argue that neo-Ottomanism is in fact a facade for a more robust Islamism,
characterized not by a ‘re-balancing’ but in fact, a turn away from Europe and ‘its’
11 Lerna K. Yanık (2016) Bringing the Empire Back In: The Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in
Turkish Foreign Policy, Die Welt des Islams, 56(3–4) (p. 488).
12 Quoted in Svante Cornell (2012) What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?, Middle East Quarterly, 19(1),
pp. 13–24 (quote at p. 18).
13 Shahrvand (2015) Don kishot-i osmani dar tehran [Ottoman Don Quixote in Tehran], April 7.
14 Tas¸pinar, Turkey’s Middle East Policies.
15 D€unya (2012) Sırtımızı Dogu’ya, G€uney’e D€onmeyiz [Our backs to the East, there’s no turning South],
April 22.
16 Rasim €Ozg€ur D€onmez (2015) Nationalism in Turkey under Justice and Development Party Rule: The
Logic of Masculinist Protection, Turkish Studies, 16, pp. 554–571.
17 M. Hakan Yavuz (2016) Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-
National Vision, Die Welt des Islams, 56(3–4), p. 440.
values and toward the Middle East and ‘its’ values.18 These stronger associations often
are grounded in orientalist or quasi-orientalist arguments that assume the existence of
two distinct and incompatible sets of values: ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western.’ Svante
Cornell, for instance, points to the orientalist and Huntingtonian arguments made by
the architect of Turkey’s foreign policy, the former Foreign and Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu, as indicative of neo-Ottomanism’s Islamist undercurrents.19 There are,
however, also those, such as Soner C¸agaptay, who argue that a careful analysis of the
AKP’s actual foreign policies reveals its Islamist orientation.20 Interestingly, however,
since C¸agaptay imagines the Ottoman Empire as less of an Islamist and more of a lib-
eral entity, he argues that AKP’s foreign policy is not in fact neo-Ottoman, but simply
Islamist.21 Yavuz, however, argues that neo-Ottomanism is itself a feature of AKP for-
eign policy, but that at its core, it is ‘Islamist, anti-Western, adventurist, and
ideological.’22
The third image of the Ottoman Empire that informs analyses and representations of
Turkish foreign (as well as domestic) policy is the image of the Ottoman Empire as a
liberal, multicultural empire. Turkey’s increasing interest in regional affairs, particu-
larly its recent forays into regional democracy promotion, can be seen as part of an
effort to build on such legacy of the Ottoman Empire.23 The image of a multicultural
and liberal empire was also the image utilized by the AKP to promote what it (and
many others) saw as a more liberal domestic politics that included what had been
called political ‘openings,’ for instance, the Kurdish, Alevi and democratic ‘openings.’
When transposed onto Turkey’s regional ambitions it was argued that this, along with
its economic boom, helped lay the ‘geopolitical’ foundations for the implementation of
neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy.24 For the first two terms in government, the AKP
seemed to be trying actively to build on this image of the Ottoman Empire—in both
foreign and domestic politics. Toward the end of the second, and into its third terms,
with its domestic policies increasingly criticized as anti-democratic and anti-liberal, it
seems to have adopted a different Ottoman template with which to work: a subject
that is discussed further in the last section of this article when exploring domes-
tic politics.
Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy
As the previous explanation reveals, when used to describe Turkish foreign policy the
term neo-Ottomanism is, firstly, open to a broad range of interpretations. This indicates
is that it can be applied flexibly to virtually any aspect of Turkish foreign policy,
18 See: Soner C¸agaptay (2009) The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, The
Washington Institute: Policy Analysis, April 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-akps-foreign-policy-the-misnomer-of-neo-ottomanism , accessed January 25,
2018; and Cornell, What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?
19 Cornell, What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?, p. 20
20 C¸agaptay, The AKP’s Foreign Policy
21 Ibid.
22 Yavuz, Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism
23 Senem Aydin-D€uzgit & E. Fuat Keyman (2014) Democracy Support in Turkey’s Foreign Policy,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2014. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.
org/2014/03/25/democracy-support-in-turkey-s-foreign-policy/h5ne, accessed February 1, 2018.
24 Arin, The New Turkey
which can be construed to have an echo of its Ottoman past. It is a malleable concept,
and any number of historical precedents can be used in its application, as can be seen
in foreign policy analyses from academics both in Turkey and beyond. Even critics of
its usage, such as Soner C¸agaptay,25 have attempted to disprove the label by asserting
selective historical dissimilarities, such as current Turkish foreign policy not support-
ing Georgia, or not being even handed toward Israel-Palestine. However, it is just as
easy to appropriate historical examples that speak to Ottomanness, such as Akin
Unver’s description of Erdogan’s attempts to revive ‘Pax Ottomanica’26—the zenith of
Ottoman power, wealth and influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as
well as the various examples highlighted in the previous section. Danforth also points
to the sense that the debate around the AKP’s foreign policy becomes too easily read
in terms of a perceived false or over-simplified dichotomy of pro-Ottoman Islamists
vs. anti-Ottoman secularists.27 He also notes that the term can be manipulated to suit
the context in which it is being applied, such as when it is used to describe both
Erdogan’s previously good relations with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and his subsequent
support for Syrian opposition forces fighting the al-Assad regime.28
It is also worth remembering that neo-Ottomanism as a term is not confined to the
AKP period. There is its initial usage by Greece as a neo-imperial stick to beat the
Turks with following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and some antecedents can be
seen in the way Turgut €Ozal’s foreign policy was described in the late 1980s and early
1990s.29 €Ozal certainly drew on elements of Ottoman identity to challenge state-cen-
tric, Turkish notions of identity, and arguably opened a space for debate over Turkish
identity and in doing so its implications for foreign policy.30 While there was greater
engagement with former Ottoman territories, €Ozal’s foreign policy was about utilizing
Turkish culture in a much broader sense, particularly with the emphasis on cultivating
relations with the Turkic states of Central Asia. This was demonstrated through the
establishment of the International Organization of Turkic Culture (T€URKSOY), which
grouped together the Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, along
with the Turkic republics of the Russian Federation.
In her instructive overview of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy, Lerna
Yanık argues that neo-Ottomanism has been a ‘cumulative process that has been
unfolding mostly since the 1960s,’31 not coming into fully fledged usage until after the
1980 coup. This sense of neo-Ottomanism, while not always explicit, was beginning to
shape foreign policy in the 1990s and came closest to practice as opposed to the more
rhetorical slant of the 1980s neo-Ottoman discourse, with regular references to
Turkey’s historical and geographical connections to former Ottoman domains.32 Hakan
Yavuz also sketches the use of the discourse and argues that neo-Ottomanism as
25 C¸agaptay, The AKP’s Foreign Policy
26 Akin Unver (2014) Pax Erdogana: Is this the end of an era?, Al Jazeera: Opinion, October 27.
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/10/pax-erdogana-this-end-an-era-
2014102751353514897.html, accessed January 26, 2018.
27 Danforth, Multi-Purpose Empire, p. 655
28 Ibid.
29 See for example, M. Hakan Yavuz (1998) Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of
Neo-Ottomanism, Middle East Critique, 7(12), pp. 19–41; and €Ozt€urk, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy
30 Yavuz, Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux, p. 24
31 Yanık, Bringing the Empire Back In, p. 469
32 Ibid, pp. 480–484
articulated by €Ozal was based more on the liberal, multi-cultural interpretation of
Turkey’s past and role in the region, in contrast to Erdogan’s more assertive
application.33
If the notions previously outlined were to be used, then the first reading (which uti-
lized to the image of the Ottoman Empire as the ‘cradle or apex of civilization’) per-
haps would provide the best fit, as this provides an all-encompassing idea of
‘Ottomanness’ and Turkish identity more widely that equates to a utilization of its per-
ceived civilizational weight and grandeur. This also runs close to the breadth of
Turkish cultural foreign policy adopted during the €Ozal era. This is also broadly where
Davutoglu pitched his conception of Turkish foreign policy as both an academic and
politician. The choosing of the wider, civilizational conception as an explanandum at
first may appear to be a convenient alignment with Davutoglu/AKP foreign policy, but
what it actually reflects is the importance placed on public and cultural diplomacy as
will be explained later. Davutoglu’s own academic work outlines the notion of
‘strategic depth’ as a guiding feature of Turkish foreign policy, arguing that Turkey is
central to regional and indeed world politics, and that it should draw on its historical
and civilizational standing to enhance its position. Thus, Davutoglu provides an inter-
esting case of an academic putting his theoretical work into some kind of policy prac-
tice. His civilizational reference points, however, also, as mentioned earlier, can invite
an interpretation that sees Davutoglu promoting a neo-Ottomanism that is Islamist in
character on the grounds that he has a worldview that sees Islam and other civiliza-
tions (namely the West) as ontologically different.34 Scholars of Turkish foreign policy
and the literature surrounding its analysis also may note the 2014 set of articles by
Behl€ul €Ozkan35 on Davutoglu’s worldview, which refute the neo-Ottoman tag and give
it the label of a ‘pan-Islamist’ foreign policy. However, yet another reading of
Davutoglu’s foreign policy is that it takes the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps even
Turkish culture and identity at its broadest and then selectively utilizes this to
Turkey’s advantage in its foreign relations.36 Turkish foreign policy arguably has been
undergoing something of a ‘cultural turn’ since €Ozal, which also corresponds with a
reconnecting with its Ottoman past domestically. This is reflected in the move in IR
toward constructivist explanations and the increased popularity of soft power as a tool
in a country’s diplomatic armory.
If Turkish diplomacy were to promote an explicit ‘neo-Ottoman’ agenda, however
that might be defined, it would be tantamount to diplomatic suicide. There is not one
33 Yavuz, Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism.
34 Cornell, What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?, p. 20.
35 See Behl€ul €Ozkan (2014) Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism, Survival, 56(4), pp.
119–140; and Behl€ul €Ozkan (2014) Turkey’s Imperial Fantasy, New York Times, August 28, 2014.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-davutoglu-and-turkeys-imperial-
fantasy.html?pagewanted¼all&_r¼0, accessed January 10, 2018.
36 There are some similarities with Iran in the way in which Turkey also has appropriated elements of
cultural diplomacy in seeking to expand its regional and wider influence. This can be seen in the work
of the Iranian ‘Islamic Culture and Relations Organization’ (with a focus on Muslim states, and
particularly countries with large Shi(i populations), as well as its promotion of cultural and historical
ties with Central Asia and specifically the Persian-speaking world (namely, Afghanistan and
Tajikistan). See further: Edward Wastnidge (2015) The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power—from cultural
diplomacy to soft war, Politics, 35(3–4), pp. 364–377; Nadia von Maltzahn (2013) The Syria-Iran Axis:
Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris); and E.
Wastnidge (2014) Pragmatic Politics: Iran-Central Asia relations since 1991, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, 15(4), pp. 119–130.
state in the former Ottoman domains that would wish to see any kind of assertive
Turkish influence in the imperial sense. One only has to look at the contrast between
the rhetorical bluster that typifies the recent Turkish position over Mosul, and the dis-
tinct lack of resolve fully to engage militarily there, to see that there is little desire for
a Turkish neo-imperial adventure in former Ottoman domains. Indeed the ‘neo-
Ottoman’ label has been used in the regional press and media analysis of Turkish for-
eign policy as symptomatic of perceived Turkish over ambition,37 and Sotiris Livas
has noted the changing perceptions of Turkey in the Arab media, which have
expressed an increasing scepticism regarding perceived Turkish neo-imperialism in the
Middle East.38 As Yanık has highlighted, Turkish statesmen historically have been
wary of using the neo-Ottoman label in foreign policy.39 Even Davutoglu subsequently
has had to go on record several times to correct what he sees as a misnomer. In an
interview with Balkan Insight in 2011, he explained:
I am not a neo-Ottoman. Actually, there is no such policy. We have a common
history and cultural depth with the Balkan countries, which nobody can deny. We
cannot act as if the Ottomans never existed in this region. My perception of
history in the Balkans is that we have to focus on the positive aspects of our
common past.40
This seems to substantiate the argument that Davutoglu was trying to shape Turkish
foreign policy by appropriating selectively what he perceives as ‘positive’ aspects of
Turkey’s historical and cultural connections with the Balkans. In 2011, Erdogan had
made a similar argument in an article he wrote for Newsweek, distancing himself and
the foreign policy Turkey pursued under his government from the label
“neo-Ottoman”:
Turkey is becoming a global and regional player with its soft power. Turkey is
rediscovering its neighborhood, one that had been overlooked for decades. It is
following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the Balkans to the Middle
East and the Caucasus. Turkey’s ‘zero-problem, limitless trade’ policy with the
countries of the wider region aims to create a haven of nondogmatic stability for
all of us…This is not a romantic neo-Ottomanism: It is realpolitik based on a
new vision of the global order.41
The AKP’s foreign policy also has been focused on enhancing Turkey’s position
through an attempted use of soft power as expressed by former key AKP figures such
37 Further examples can be seen with the following: Islamic Republic News Agency [IRNA] (2015) Now
osmani geri va chaleshha-i pishravi-i turkiyeh [Neo-Ottomanists and Turkey’s developing challenges]
February 28. Available at: http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/81522826/, accessed January 29, 2018; and
Catherine Shakdam (2014) Is Turkey attempting to resurrect the Ottoman Empire on the back of the
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as Davotuglu,42 and as seen in the above quote by Erdogan. Soft power often has been
used in analyses of Turkish foreign policy and helps shed light on how the concept of
a broad neo-Ottoman approach has been applied in Turkey’s public and cultural diplo-
macy. Some scholars emphasize Turkey’s democratic credentials as a form of soft
power, insofar as Turkey is acting as a ‘model’ for regional states.43 Other scholars
seek to incorporate Turkey’s development assistance into their understanding of soft
power projection. This is evidenced through activities such as the Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TIKA),44 which has relevance for Turkey’s ambitions in
acting as a benevolent guide to global south countries.
Murat Yes¸iltas¸ and Ali Balcı see Turkey’s soft power approach as being based
on ‘three foundational principles of historical and cultural connection with the
region: the democratic tradition democratic institutions and a free market econ-
omy.’45 This is a close reflection of Davutoglu’s conception of Turkish soft power,
one that is articulated through ‘… a new language in regional and international pol-
itics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-economic power.’46 Similarly, Bilgehan €Ozt€urk
focuses on the ‘softer’ aspects of its public diplomacy, with Turkey speaking
‘softly’ on regional issues,47 again a point highlighted by Davutoglu’s emphasis on
utilizing a new diplomatic language in Turkish foreign policy. This is an interpret-
ation shared by Ziya €Onis¸ and S¸uhnaz Yilmaz,48 who emphasize such elements of
Turkey’s diplomacy efforts, particularly its attempts to act as mediator in regional
and global issues.
Ayhan Kaya, however, offers a slightly more nuanced take, distinguishing between
the ways such soft power is viewed.49 He highlights the AKP’s own view of it as
being based on religious affinity, whereas in the West the focus is on Turkey’s demo-
cratic credentials serving as a model. For Tas¸pinar on the other hand, it is multi-
faceted and all-encompassing, amounting to a ‘… bridge between East and West, a
Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic eco-
nomic force.’50
Where the above uses of soft power tend to run into problems is when they take it
as a given feature of international affairs and public diplomacy. However, three recent
scholarly contributions in the form of critical appraisals of soft power perhaps shed
most light on Turkey’s use of this tool and its relevance for understanding neo-
42 Ahmet Davutoglu (2010) Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, May 20. Available
at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/, accessed January
27, 2018.
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AKP Era: Has there been an axis shift?, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 11(3), pp. 139–148.
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Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, Foreign Policy Analysis, 11(2), pp.
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Ottomanism within Turkish foreign policy. Lukes,51 for example, argues that because
power is a potentiality rather than an actuality it is difficult to measure and may indeed
never be actualized, which can be applied to notions of soft power. Thus, it serves the
selective appropriation of Ottoman history and its presentation as soft power. To this
end it suits Turkish foreign policy-makers, and advocates of the AKP’s approach, in
that it appeals to a nostalgic ideal that can be construed as a form of neo-Ottomanism.
Miskimmon et al.52 emphasize how many studies into soft power fail to fully measure
or appreciate its impact. For Miskimmom et al., the idea of ‘strategic narrative’ (how
actors form and project narratives and how third parties interpret and interact with
these narratives) is of greater importance in emphasizing the role of power and com-
munication in international relations. This could be applied to Davutoglu’s efforts at
projecting a form of soft power that takes a broad, civilizational conception of Turkish
(and with it, Ottoman) identity as its starting point, and sees its subsequent channeling
through a narrative as articulated by his own strategic depth concept of Turkish foreign
policy. Finally, through focusing on the idea of ‘representational force,’ Mattern53
emphasizes that, in contrast to Nye’s54 famous formulation of soft power being about
‘co-option and attraction’ as opposed to ‘coercion and payment’ a certain degree of
coercion is in fact inherent in the means utilized to deploy soft power. This is due to
the necessity of making oneself (in this case Turkey) attractive to the audience in ques-
tion. Therefore, soft power may not be as benign as it may appear at first sight, and
thus fits with Turkey’s strategic priorities in becoming a key player in regional and
global politics, utilizing its historical and cultural connections where they serve
a purpose.
Thus, what can be observed in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP era is a kind
of public and cultural diplomacy push, whereby Davutoglu has attempted to craft a
multi-faceted foreign policy that speaks to regional states on a ‘common’ level. This
use of a neo-Ottoman sentiment has been funneled through Turkey’s heritage, religious
networks, and shared history as a means of extending its influence.55 Danforth sums
this up well in noting that: ‘… for increasingly dynamic Turkish businesses looking to
sell biscuits or build houses in nearby states, from Macedonia to Iraq, it helped to be
able to talk about a shared history defined by cooperation rather than conflict.’56 This
demonstrates how the selective appropriation of history seen in the AKP’s foreign rela-
tions is at a broad level. Therefore, common Ottoman heritage is used as a legitimating
tool be the AKP in its efforts to re-establish Turkey’s leadership role in the region
where it geographically and spiritually belongs.57 Hence it is about presenting Turkey
as a cooperative and significant regional player and utilizing those historical and cul-
tural signifiers that are found in its Ottoman past to affect its present.
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Neo-Ottomanism in Domestic Politics
Sustained reflections on the presence of neo-Ottomanist discourses in domestic politics
are missing from the literature on neo-Ottomanism, due largely to its foreign policy
focus. In some ways, domestic discourses on neo-Ottomanism are similar to the previ-
ously discussed foreign policy discourses. Like in foreign policy, the domestic dis-
courses are grounded in the desire for a ‘great restoration’ of lost, ‘ancient values,’58
although precisely what those ‘values’ are remains contested, as different groups
imagine vastly different Ottoman Empires. Thus, for some critics (and champions) of
the AKP, its policies are a return to the Islamism of the Ottoman Empire, while for
others, they are indicative of an embrace of the liberal and multicultural legacy of the
Empire.59 Furthermore, Nicholas Danforth, sees the appetite for all things Ottoman
within Turkey as variously ‘… a new act of religious, transnational or national appro-
priation, or in many cases a blend of all three.’60
To some extent, therefore, there are similarities in foreign and domestic usages of
the concept of neo-Ottomanism. As €Ozel Volfova has highlighted in her examination
of neo-Ottoman discourses under the AKP, ‘The sense of pride emerging from
Turkey’s Ottoman past and focusing on Turkey’s Ottoman identity in public discourse
corresponds with the AKP’s political, economic and cultural practices at home, as well
as abroad.’61 However, there are also some significant differences. First, while in for-
eign policy the AKP government has been weary of the neo-Ottoman label, it seems to
have embraced it in domestic discourses. Since coming to power, but especially in its
second and third terms in government, the AKP increasingly has appropriated a neo-
Ottomanism as a rhetorical and legitimating framework for its domestic policies.
As with foreign policy, there is precedent in terms of neo-Ottoman-like practices
prior to the AKP coming to power. Esra €Ozy€urek notes the popular appropriation of
religious symbols, among the Turkish Islamist constituency starting in the 1990s, in a
foregrounding of the attempted Islamization and anti-Kemalist drive that was to
come,62 and that this competition has ‘… significant consequences in changing the
way citizens conceptualize the state and their relationship to it.’63 Like Kemalists,
Islamist political activists harnessed a memory-based politics but instead yearned for
the Ottoman past with its attendant focus on Islam, and thus Ottomanism became
popular among the rising Islamist elites during the 1990s.64 In a similar vein, Alev
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C¸ınar outlines the Refah Party’s use of Ottoman symbolism in the 1990s, when party
leaders presented Ottoman-Islamic civilization as Turkey’s ‘true national culture’ and
national identity.65 This view found an articulation via city administrations’ promo-
tional activities that sought to present Istanbul as an Ottoman-Islamic city,66 and Refah
mayors’ introduced state objects inflected with Ottoman-Islamic references.67
The AKP has been active in embracing and promoting a specific understanding of
neo-Ottomanism in domestic politics. It has done so in three interrelated ways: (1) by
attempting to establish a direct lineage between particular members of the house of
Osman (especially Sultan Abd€ulhamid II) and high-ranking members of the AKP
(especially, though not exclusively, the former Prime Minister and current President
Erdogan); (2) by, in turn, arguing that the historical enemies of the Ottoman Empire
(and especially Adb€ulhamid II) still are working to undermine the power of Turkey
and its leadership; and (3) by claiming that AKP policies and programs are a continu-
ation or expansion of the policies and programs of the Ottoman Empire (especially the
late Ottoman Empire). Although in reality, these three discourses are intimately related
and intertwined, an analytical distinction has been drawn here for heuristic purposes.
Where they differ from the previously mentioned attempts to bring in Ottoman refer-
ence points during the 1990s, as highlighted by €Ozy€urek, C¸ınar, and Navarro-Yashin,
is that their appropriation comes not as a counter identity to Kemalism but as a form
of hegemonic identity, reflecting the power of the AKP in contemporary Turkish polit-
ics. The AKP’s harnessing of Ottoman identity is highly selective, and so rather than
drawing on the multicultural Ottoman project of the nineteenth century and of the
Young Turks in response to the creeping authoritarianism of Abd€ulhamid,68 it can be
viewed as a repurposing of the authoritarian, Islamist tendencies of that ruler. In con-
trasting the Ottomanism of €Ozal and Erdogan, Hakan Yavuz distinguishes between
€Ozal’s pluralist approach which recognized the rise and power of Turkey’s varied
communities, whereas Erdogan’s approach is more about ‘state power and the concen-
tration of power in the hands of a single individual.’69
AKP and pro-AKP discourses of neo-Ottomanism are revealing of an attempt to
establish a direct lineage between key figures, and supporters of the AKP government
and the Ottomans. Complementing generic attempts to establish and capitalize on this
lineage—such as Erdogan’s statement ‘We are the grandchildren of Ottomans!’70—are
more specific attempts to link leading figures in the AKP government, as well as key
government policies, to those of the late Ottoman Empire. The AKP’s Press Secretary,
for instance, has stated that, ‘Erdogan has realized [Sultan] Abd€ulhamid’s dream of
building a road between the northernmost and southernmost cities in Turkey,’71 while
Erdogan himself has argued that the Marmaray (an underground train connecting the
European and Asian parts of Istanbul) is the realization of Sultan Abd€ulmecid’s
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dream.72 Others have argued that, like Abd€ulhamid, who never borrowed money from
foreign powers, Erdogan has eliminated Turkey’s debt to the IMF.73 In a video accom-
panying Davutoglu’s accession to the Turkish prime ministership, the accompanying
soundtrack lauds him as ‘the awaited spirit of Abd€ulhamid.’74 AKP candidates for the
general election held in June 2015 appeared on election posters in traditional Ottoman
dress, while Erdogan has welcomed Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to Turkey
flanked by costumed warrior representing various ‘Turkic’ empires, from the Huns of
200 BC to the Seljuk, Mughal and Ottoman empires.
The AKP and its supporters seem particularly keen on creating a discursive link
between Erdogan and the late Ottoman Sultan Abd€ulhamid. This discursive link also
has extended to the argument that the historical enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and
especially those of Adb€ulhamid, are still at work trying to destabilize modern Turkey,
and particularly, the AKP government. Showing images of Abd€ulhamid and Erdogan,
AKP Assembly Member Metin Kulunk made the following statement: ‘This nation
will not let you swallow its leaders. You are talking at Raki [a Turkish alcoholic
drink] tables how Erdogan will be gotten rid of, but you are mistaken.’75 Others have
compared the March 31, 1909 rebellion, which dethroned Abd€ulhamid, to the 2013
Gezi Park protests, arguing that foreign powers and interests were behind both, trying
to discredit and destabilise the AKP government as they did Abd€ulhamid.76 Ergun
Diler, Editor in Chief of the newspaper Takvim (a mouthpiece of the AKP govern-
ment), has painted Erdogan as the avenger of Abd€ulhamid.77 For others, such as Daily
Sabah columnist Burhanettin Duran, writing after the 2016 coup attempt, a similarity
lies in their respective consolidations of power in times of political change.78 A brief
look at the social media accounts of AKP ministers and supporters reveals a similar
sentiment: that Abd€ulhamid had been ‘wasted’ and will be avenged by Erdogan.
In the wake of the Gezi Park protests and the late 2013–early 2014 corruption scan-
dals in which high ranking AKP officials and Erdogan’s family were implicated, accu-
sations of foreign attempts ‘once again’ to destabilize Turkey (as they did with the
Ottoman Empire) were made on an almost daily basis. A ‘foreign interest lobby’ was
accused of trying to destabilize the Turkish economy, and shortly after the Gezi Park
protests, Erdogan organized a number of ‘respect for national sovereignty’ rallies
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during which he accused Gezi Park protestors of serving as puppets of foreign powers
bent on undermining the strength of the Turkish nation.79 In an attempt to link his
resistance to the demands of Gezi Park protesters to the resistance of the late Ottoman
Empire to foreign intervention and domination, Erdogan urged those supporting or
attending the rallies to show their support by displaying Ottoman (as opposed to
Turkish republican) flags.80 More recently, Erdogan claimed that the ‘foreign powers’
he has accused of interfering in Ottoman affairs and thereby causing its demise were
supporting the HDP (People’s Democratic Platform, progressive leftist political party
with a dominant but not exclusive Kurdish base with human rights, democratization,
and justice as its main focus). When HDP passed the 10 percent threshold required to
get assembly seats, pro-AKP papers and other media outlets interpreted this as an
achievement of the said ‘foreign powers’ rather than that of HDP.81
It would be useful to reflect on the AKP historical references at this point. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was stagnating. Believing
that modernization and reform would strengthen the Empire’s international standing
and win back the loyalty of those increasingly disinterested in its survival, the Young
Turks, a group of Western-educated intellectuals and soldiers, demanded a constitu-
tional monarchy from Sultan Abdulaziz (reign: 1861–1876). Following his rejection of
such demand, Abdulaziz was dethroned and replaced with his brother, Murat V, who
reigned for 90 days, before himself being dethroned by Adb€ulhamid II (reigned
1876–1909), who established a constitution and assembly in 1876. However, using the
war with the Russian Empire as an excuse, Adb€ulhamid II suspended them two years
later, and from 1878 onward presided over an authoritarian regime in which he penal-
ized all criticism of the Sultan and his government, established a notorious secret ser-
vice, and promoted Sunni Muslim values above others; in addition, the first massacres
of Armenians took place in this period (the 1890s).
These developments were important factors behind the emergence of two groups
with similar ideas: intellectuals who fled to France following the suspension of the
assembly and constitution, and who were there called the ‘Young Turks’; and soldiers,
predominantly based in Saloniki, called the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress).
In 1908 the army, led by the CUP, engaged in what has been called the Young Turk
Revolution, known at time as the ‘Revolution for Freedom.’ To appease the revolu-
tionaries and avoid possible removal from the throne and even execution Adbulhamid
declared a second constitutional era. On March 31, 1909 a group of religious funda-
mentalists attempted a counterrevolution, in which Adbulhamid denied involvement,
calling it an English plot to destabilize the Empire. The CUP army crushed the revolu-
tion, executing everyone involved and exiling Abd€ulhamid to Saloniki. Though
Mehmed V became Abd€ulhamid’s successor, the CUP ruled from behind the scenes.
Abd€ulhamid eventually was brought back to the Yildiz Palace (due to the loss of
Saloniki in the Balkan Wars), where he died in 1918. The CUP army that dethroned
Abd€ulhamid included the future leader of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atat€urk. The
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argument of those who would establish a direct lineage between the AKP and
Abd€ulhamid is that Erdogan, like Abd€ulhamid, has similar enemies trying to ‘dethrone’
him: secular, republican elites and foreign powers. AKP supporters, in turn, argue that
they will avenge Abd€ulhamid, who, like Erdogan, was a supporter of the ‘people’
against the army and the elites who destroyed him. In 2016, Erdogan himself accused
thousands of academics and artists who signed a petition calling for an end to state
violence in the Kurdish southeast of being ‘lumpen elites who no longer are able to
rule Turkey as they did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’82
This attempt to create a direct lineage and to ‘avenge Ottoman history’ is not just
discursive or a rhetorical revisionism of history, whereby an attempt is made to by-
pass or minimize what has been painted as the ‘republican period’ (1923–2003) of
Turkish history.83 Rather, attempts to create such lineage have non-discursive, material
counterparts. Most recently, Ottoman language courses have been made a requirement
from primary school onward;84 the number of Imam Hatip schools85 has increased at
the expense of public schools, with many public schools being turned into Imam Hatip
schools;86 neo-Ottoman architecture has been promoted at the expense of ‘republican’
or modern architecture—with proposals to replace the Prime Minister’s residence in
C¸ankaya, an example of early modern architecture, with ‘a building representative of
Turkish architectural style’ (i.e., ‘neo-Ottoman-ish’),87 to raze Gezi Park in order to
build a shopping center and condominiums in faux-Ottoman style,88 and to replace the
Atat€urk Cultural Centre with a ‘Baroque’ style opera house.89 For Yavuz these can be
viewed, at the most critical interpretation, as ‘inauthentic, imaginary fabrications of the
past that manipulate, distort, or downright ignore historical evidence.’90
Interestingly, however, the figure of Abd€ulhamid also can be repurposed to offer a
powerful critique of the AKP government. There exists another, more sinister legacy
of Abd€ulhamid: the long legacy of authoritarianism that followed the brief democratic
opening of 1876–1878. According to this alternative lineage, Erdogan could be seen
not as a reincarnation of the populist Abd€ulhamid, fighting on behalf of the people
against an authoritarian, foreign-backed elite, but as a corrupt, authoritarian ruler. As
previously mentioned, Adb€ulhamid criminalized all dissent and established the
Ottoman Secret Service, an organization responsible for the arrest and disappearance
thousands of critics and political opponents of the Sultan. During his decade in power,
criticism of Erdogan likewise has become increasingly criminalized, with thousands
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arrested and hundreds serving lengthy prison sentences for what would be considered
the cornerstones of liberal democracy—freedom of speech, dissent and assembly.91
State officers, police officers, members of the army, and bureaucrats who have
opposed Erdogan, more often than not, have found themselves either out of a job,
imprisoned, or reassigned. This situation was compounded further in the post-2016
coup attempt purge of suspected G€ulenists, and the imprisonment of prominent journal-
ists, notably from the staunchly republican daily Cumhuriyet, whose critical editorial
policy was seen as evidence of its collaboration with those supporting the attempted
coup.92 This fits into what Rasim €Ozg€ur D€onmez93 describes as a paternalistic narra-
tive of ‘masculinist protection’ to exclude opposition from the public sphere. In a drive
to cleanse Turkish political and civic offices of those with alleged links to the G€ulen
movement—which Erdogan named as the key sponsor of the coup attempt—the
Turkish state arrested some 47,000 people.
Erdogan’s election to the post of president, and subsequent victory in the 2017 refer-
endum on creating an executive presidential system in Turkey, has raised suspicions
that he is consolidating power, in the style of Putin and Medvedev in Russia. Those
suspicions were built up prior to the constitutional amendment by Erdogan’s reinter-
pretation of the presidential role to include direct involvement in the governing of the
country, in opposition to the largely ceremonial role normally had by the president. On
many occasions, Erdogan insisted that his preferred presidential system would be based
on a genuinely Turkish model and not resemble the American presidency as the latter
had too many institutions, such as the Senate, curtailing the powers of the President
and limiting his/her ability to take necessary action (such as, Erdogan once said,
‘taking down an enemy helicopter’).94 Translating his words into action, since his
assent to the presidency, Erdogan presided over cabinet meetings, remained intimately
involved in legislation, and attended NATO meetings—traditional purviews of the
Prime Minister in Turkish politics. Davutoglu, appointed to the post of Prime Minister
following Erdogan’s presidential election, was widely perceived as Erdogan’s puppet,
or placeholder at best, until he fell out of favor.
In addition to trying to build on and avenge the legacy of Abd€ulhamid, the AKP
also has portrayed itself as the party that has revived the liberal and multicultural leg-
acy of the Ottoman Empire. However, as was the case with Abd€ulhamid, the Ottoman
Empire’s record with regard to its minority citizens also can be repurposed to offer a
critique of the AKP government’s ostensible liberalism and multiculturalism. Though
the Ottoman Empire certainly recognized the presence of various groups within the
imperial polity, the existence of non-Sunnis was merely ‘tolerated’—as opposed to
non-Sunnis being seen as equal citizens, or subjects, of the Empire. From its founda-
tions to the early nineteenth century, the empire was built on a hierarchy among these
various groups, which translated to different rights and duties as subjects—Christians
paid more taxes than Muslims, were not allowed to bear arms, the testimony of
91 Agnes Czajka (2012) The Love Affair with Erdogan, Jadaliyya, August 27. Available at: http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7074/the-love-affair-with-erdogan-(part-1), accessed January 25, 2018.
92 Ali Bayramoglu (2017) How Journalism Became a Crime in Turkey, Al Monitor – Turkey Pulse, April
24. Available at: http://al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/04/turkey-journalism-itself-becomes-crime.
html, accessed January 17, 2018.
93 D€onmez, Nationalism in Turkey, p. 565.
94 A Haber (2015) Belediye Bas¸kanlıgımdan beri istiyorum [I’ve wanted this since I was Mayor],
January 27.
Muslims was considered superior to the testimony of Christians, and so on. In the
early part of the nineteenth century, legal reforms were undertaken to create a univer-
sal Ottoman citizenship (the original Ottomanism that should not be confused with
neo-Ottomanism). For a number of reasons—including the solidified belief that
Muslims were inherently superior to others, and emerging nationalisms (including
Turkish) within the Empire—these legal measures were not effective. So, with the
exception of the 50 or so years of the Tanzimat period, the history of the Ottoman
Empire is one in which no real equality existed.
Although the AKP began its term in government with the promise of democratiza-
tion and recognition of the equal status of religious and ethnic minorities in Turkey,
inequality persists between various groups, with the cultural rights of ‘ethnic Turks’
and Sunni Muslims increasingly taking precedence over the rights of other ethnic and
religious groups. Among the more telling statements by Erdogan was his suggestion
that Alevis should start praying in mosques instead of Cem houses,95 and his disdain
at being called an Armenian—as if it was an insult.96 As previously noted, this is not
simply populist rhetoric—it has material, policy implications. For example: the rights
of Kurdish and Armenian groups continue to be repressed, and non-Muslims do not
have the same political (or cultural) rights as Sunni-Turks. Non-Muslim schools con-
tinue to require an ethnic Turkish principle; renovation work of non-Muslim founda-
tion properties cannot be undertaken without permission of the ministry of Awqaf; the
Orthodox Christian Heybeliada Halki seminary remains closed; Kurds still only can
learn Kurdish in private schools; and though some previously confiscated property has
been returned to its non-Muslim owners (following rulings by the European Court of
Human Rights), not all property has been returned. Thus, despite AKP attempts to
value positively a particular kind of neo-Ottomanism, what emerges is a continuation
of authoritarianism and a lack of liberal, multicultural and democratic principles that
characterized the Ottoman Empire for much of its history.
Conclusion
Neo-Ottomanism is a concept that just as easily can be used as a stick with which to
beat the AKP as it can be used as a badge of diplomatic agility to hang around its
neck. Under the AKP government, Turkey has sought to use elements of public and
cultural diplomacy and development assistance to enhance its regional standing. This
has included applying a selective appropriation of Ottoman grandeur where appropri-
ate, although one that often is couched in diplomatic niceties and recognition of the
need for tactfully managing regional relations. In the international sphere, recent
events, such as the rise and fall of the so-called Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria,
have tested and indeed challenged Turkey’s ambitions, and they will be viewed in the
future as a critical juncture for Turkey’s standing in the region. Having seen its
regional ambitions take a battering in light of the conflicts on its southern borders,
95 Radikal (2013) Erdogan: Alevilik din degil; Ali ile alakaları yok [Erdogan: Alevism is not a religion, it
has nothing to do with Ali], February 22.
96 Bas¸ka Haber (2014) Erdogan: ‘Benim _Ic¸in G€urc€u Dediler. Afedersin Daha C¸irkinini S€oylediler, Ermeni
Dediler’ [Erdogan: ‘They called me Georgian. In fact, worse—they called me Armenian’], August 6.
Available at: http://www.baskahaber.org/2014/08/erdogan-benim-icin-gurcu-dediler-html, accessed
December 28, 2017.
Turkey found itself the center of geopolitical intrigue with its handling of the Jamal
Khashoggi affair, following the murder of the Saudi journalist and government critic
in Istanbul by Saudi operatives in October 2018. The crisis afforded Erdogan the
opportunity to present Turkey as a major regional player as he revealed details of the
operation with the world’s media watching.
Although the concept of neo-Ottomanism has been deployed primarily in representa-
tions and analyses of foreign policy, it can make a significant contribution to under-
standing Turkish domestic politics. The discourse of neo-Ottomanism has become
increasingly prominent in Turkish domestic politics and has significant material and
policy implications. What is more, though in a manner certainly unintended by the
AKP, its desire to draw on Turkey’s Ottoman past in domestic politics can shed light
on the creeping authoritarianism that can be observed during the AKP’s second and
third terms in government, and in its response to the coup attempt and subsequent con-
stitutional amendments. The 2016 coup afforded Erdogan the opportunity to institute a
widescale purge of his opponents and the censoring of the press.97 In doing so he cited
a hostile deep state and foreign powers as being responsible, echoing the narrative of
Turkey being besieged internally and externally, as it was during Abd€ulhamid’s reign.
It should be noted, of course, that foreign and domestic articulations and explanations
of neo-Ottomanism do not exist in a vacuum or are in some way hermetically sealed
from one another. The AKP’s selective utilization of a clearly defined, Ottoman his-
tory serves its domestic constituency well, and has been sharpened through its usage in
foreign policy thinking. However, its interests at the international level require it to
temper this logic, so references to Turkey’s Ottoman past remain pitched at the broad-
est level in order to remain palatable diplomatically. Domestically, however, following
three successful terms in government, weathering the attempted coup and establishing
a presidential system, and still remaining as the largest party in Turkish politics, the
material consequences of the AKP’s version of neo-Ottomanism remain as bold
as ever.
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